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TWO PARADIGMS AND NOBEL PRIZES IN ECONOMICS: 
 
A CONTRADICTION OR COEXISTENCE? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 Markowitz and Sharpe won the Nobel Prize in Economics more than a decade ago for the 
development of Mean-Variance analysis and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). In the year 
2002, Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in Economics for the development of Prospect Theory. Can 
these two apparently contradictory paradigms coexist? 
In deriving the CAPM, Sharpe, Lintner and Mossin assume expected utility (EU) 
maximization following the approach proposed by Markowitz, normal distributions and risk 
aversion. Kahneman & Tversky suggest  Prospect Theory (PT) and Cumulative Prospect Theory 
(CPT) as an alternative paradigm to EU theory. They show that investors distort probabilities, 
make decisions based on change of wealth, exhibit loss aversion and maximize the expectation of 
an S-shaped value function which contains a risk-seeking segment. Employing change of wealth 
rather than total wealth contradicts EU theory. The subjective distortion of probabilities violates 
the CAPM assumptions of normality and homogeneous expectations, and the S-shaped value 
function violates the risk aversion assumption. We prove in this paper that although CPT (and PT) 
is in conflict to EUT, and violates some of the CAPM’s underlying assumptions, the security 
market line theorem (SMLT) of the CAPM is intact in the CPT framework.   
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INTRODUCTION  
 
 The Mean-Variance analysis and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) awarded 
Markowitz and Sharpe the Nobel Prize in Economics more than a decade ago. Kahneman won the 
Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002 for the development of Prospect Theory. Prospect Theory 
claims characteristics of investors’ behaviour which contradict the expected utility theory in 
general, and the classical assumptions of the CAPM in particular, but unfortunately it does not 
suggest any equilibrium pricing model which can substitute the existing expected utility model 
and in particular the CAPM. Accepting Prospect Theory as the correct description of investors’ 
behavior, can we save the CAPM? Can these two paradigms coexist? To this issue we address this 
article. 
 The Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin CAPM is derived by assuming that investors are risk-averse, 
that they maximize expected utility of total wealth, and that the returns are normally distributed 
with homogeneous expectations regarding these distributions.1 Experimental studies cast doubt on 
the foundations of the CAPM.  Based on experimental findings, Prospect Theory (PT) (see 
Kahneman and Tversky [1979]) and Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) (see Tversky and 
Kahneman [1992]), were developed as an alternative paradigm to expected utility. On the one 
                                                          
1 The normality assumption can be relaxed by adding the assumption of quadratic utility functions. Because 
the quadratic utility has two severe drawbacks (U'<0 from some critical value, and increasing absolute risk 
aversion) researchers generally are not willing to assume this utility function. There are other justifications 
of the CAPM. Merton [1973] assumes continuous portfolio revisions which leads to end of period 
lognormal distributions of returns and to an instantaneous CAPM.  Levy [1973, 1977] assumes a discrete 
model of  portfolio revisions with a lognormal distribution. Other cases under which the CAPM holds are 
discussed by Levy and Samuelson [1992]. Berk [1997] provides the general restrictions on all economic 
primitives that yield the CAPM. The CAPM can be obtained also as a special case of the Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory (APT), see Ross [1976]. In this paper we use the classical Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin CAPM 
assumptions, i.e., normal distribution is assumed. 
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hand, PT and CPT have become a cornerstone in economic research and are the foundation of 
behavioural finance and behavioural economics. Indeed, this has been recognized by the Nobel 
Prize committee who awarded the prize in economics to Kahn man in 2002. On the other hand, 
the CAPM is still the most popular asset-pricing model. Thus, it is of crucial importance to study 
whether these two models can coexist.   
To this end let us highlight the following differences of PT to EUT. PT asserts that 
probabilities are distorted. This violates two assumptions of the CAPM: first, the normality 
assumption is violated, and secondly, as each investor has his/her subjective probability distortion, 
investors face heterogeneous probability distributions of returns, even if before the distortion they 
all face the same normal return distributions. Thus, the normality and the homogeneous 
expectation CAPM assumptions are violated. PT asserts that investors make decisions based on 
change of wealth which violates EUT asserting that decision-making should be based on total 
wealth rather than change of wealth. Moreover, PT claims that investors are loss averse, i.e. they 
are hurt by losses 2.25 times more than they derive utility from gains. Finally, PT assumes risk 
seeking in some range of returns, which contradicts the CAPM’s risk aversion assumption. 
The purpose of this study is to re-examine the CAPM in light of the experimental 
evidence, which refutes expected utility theory.2 To be more specific, we assume that PT and, 
alternatively, CPT, are intact, and examine the validity of the CAPM within each of these two 
frameworks.3   
We show in this paper that the security market line theorem (SMLT) of the Sharpe-
Lintner-Mossin homogeneous expectation CAPM is intact in the CPT framework. Hence, as in the 
                                                          
2 This study is devoted to the CAPM.  However, all results corresponding to the CAPM are intact also for 
the General CAPM (GCAPM) − known also as the segmented market equilibrium model, in which investors 
do not hold all available risky assets (see Levy [1978], Merton [1987], Markowitz [1990] and Sharpe 
[1991]). Thus, in the rest of the paper we focus on the CAPM, recalling that all the proofs are intact also for 
the GCAPM. 
3 In a recent study, Barberis, Huang and Santos [2001] employ some, but not all, of the components of PT to 
determine asset pricing, with two assets, one risky and one riskless. In their study, the authors investigate 
asset pricing when investors care more about fluctuations in the value of their assets than is justified by a 
concern for consumption alone. While they do not analyze directly the one-period CAPM, they add an 
important dimension to the investment decision-making procedure by analyzing the dynamics of the 
investment process. A key feature in their analysis is that risk aversion changes over time and depends on 
the prior investment performance. In their model, the high volatility of returns generates large equity 
premiums. As in PT, also in their model the investor is much more sensitive to reduction in wealth than to 
increases, i.e., loss aversion prevails.  
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standard case of EUT the valuation of assets is given by a linear relation of their excess returns 
proportional to the excess return of the market portfolio where the proportionality factor, the beta, 
is as usual given by the covariance of the assets and the market portfolios returns divided by the 
variance of the market portfolio’s return. This is a surprising result, in particular because with 
CPT the distributions of returns are subjectively distorted; hence investors face heterogeneous 
expectations of returns.  
Our reasoning goes as follows: The SMLT is derived from Two Fund Separation which in turn 
holds if investor’s decisions can be described by the mean-variance-principle (MVP). We say that 
the MVP holds if investor decisions are solely based on the mean and variances of the portfolios 
and if the utility of the investor is increasing in mean. With normally distributed returns the MVP 
is equivalent to first-order-stochastic dominance (FSD). Thus our claims are made if we can show 
that PT contradicts FSD while CPT is consistent with FSD.  
The structure of this paper is as follows: In Section I, we provide a brief review of PT, 
CPT and the CAPM assumptions. In Section II, we contrast PT and EUT theory and explain why 
the CAPM collapses if PT is the correct framework of investors' behavior. In addition, we show 
that if the modified version of PT, i.e. the CPT is adopted, then no contradiction exists between 
the CAPM and CPT.  Thus, we demonstrate that if investors behave as suggested by CPT, the 
SMLT is intact even though CPT contradicts EUT. Concluding remarks are given in Section III. 
 
I. The Two Competing Paradigms 
The CAPM, developed by Sharpe [1964], Lintner [1965] and Mossin [1966] is no doubt 
one of the most influential contributions to modern finance. Yet, this model is controversial and 
has been criticized on theoretical as well as on empirical grounds. Despite the theoretical and 
empirical criticism which will be discussed below, the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin CAPM is still the 
most common risk-return equilibrium model; it appears virtually in all finance textbooks, and no 
other simple equilibrium model has yet been proposed in the literature as a real challenge to the 
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CAPM. In particular PT and CPT, which raise objection to the EUT and the CAPM do not suggest 
an asset pricing model to substitute for the CAPM. 
Many empirical studies criticize the CAPM. The most comprehensive empirical study 
refuting the CAPM is probably the one conducted by Fama and French [1992]. Nevertheless, the 
CAPM also has some empirical and experimental supports (for example, see Fama and MacBeth 
[1973], Miller and Scholes [1972], Amihud, Christensen and Mandelson [1992], Jagannathan and 
Wang [1996], and Levy [1997]).4  
 The CAPM is derived in the von Neuman-Morgenstern (NM) expected utility framework, 
and because EUT is experimentally criticized, the CAPM is indirectly also criticized. Let us 
elaborate. The NM expected utility framework (as well as most other economic models) assumes 
that investors are rational, and that they maximize expected utility.  However, not all agree with 
these "rational investor" assumptions. The most well known paradox of expected utility 
maximization was presented by Allais [1953].  Since the early fifties, psychologists have 
conducted experiments revealing evidence that individuals behave in a way which contradicts the 
NM expected utility. In particular, in making choices between alternative uncertain prospects, 
individuals tend to distort the objective probabilities in a systematic manner, which may lead to 
the choice of an inferior investment and to wealth destruction. In a very influential article, 
Kahneman & Tversky [1979] (K&T) challenged the expected utility paradigm by suggesting 
Prospect Theory (PT) as an alternative descriptive paradigm. PT is based on experimental findings 
regarding subjects' behavior and strictly contradicts the NM expected utility. Although PT has 
several components, the four main elements as appear in K&T’s 1979 paper are:  
a) Investors employ subjective decision weights, ω(p), rather than the objective 
probabilities, p.  
b) Investors base their decisions on change of wealth, x, rather than on total wealth w+x. 
Thus, they maximize the expectation of a value function V(x) rather than of a utility function 
U(w+x). 
                                                          
4 For the difficulties of testing the CAPM with ex-post data, see Roll [1977]. Yet, Levy [1997] 
experimentally tested the CAPM with ex-ante parameters, which is not exposed to Roll's criticism. With ex-
ante parameters, Levy [1997] finds strong support for  both the CAPM and the GCAPM. 
  5
c) The value function is S-shaped: V′ > 0, for all x ≠ 0, V″ > 0, for x < 0, and V″ < 0 for x 
> 0, where x is the change in wealth. Moreover, the value function exhibits loss aversion, i.e. at 
x=0 the derivative from the left is 2.25 bigger than the derivative from the right.5. 
The shape of the value function may change with wealth. Yet, the property of risk seeking for x < 
0 and risk aversion for x > 0 holds for any initial wealth level. In pursuing PT, various researchers, 
including K&T themselves, realize that a decision model where weights  ω(p) rather than 
probabilities, p, are employed has three drawbacks: 1) it may contradict first-degree stochastic 
dominance (FSD), i.e. the monotonicity axiom, 2) the sum of the subjective probabilities, ω(p), 
may add up to more or less than 1, and 3) that decision weights, ω(p), technically cannot be 
applied to continuous distributions. To overcome these drawbacks, Quiggin [1982], Yaari [1987], 
Allais [1988], and Tversky and Kahneman (T&K) [1992] themselves, suggest that the subjects 
conduct a transformation of the cumulative distribution, rather than a transformation of the 
probabilities.6 T&K suggest the Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) as a modification to PT, 
where the cumulative distribution functions are distorted. The other two components of PT 
mentioned above (basing decisions on change in wealth and the S-shaped value function) remain 
also in CPT. 
In the next section, we show that PT and CPT contradict EUT, which casts doubt on the 
validity of virtually all the economic and finance models which rely on expected utility theory. In 
particular, it questions the validity of the CAPM which is a model developed in the EUT 
framework. However, despite this contradiction, we show that the SMLT of the CAPM is 
surprisingly valid under CPT. 
 
                                                          
5 For some evidence regarding the investors' behavior in practice, in light of the S-shaped function, see 
Shefrin and Stateman [1985] and Odean [1998]. Benartzi and Thaler [1995] analyze the role of loss 
aversion  on pricing of stocks and bonds and, in particular, on the risk premium which is too high to be 
explained with risk aversion alone. Their solution to the equity-premium puzzle, is that people consider 
annual returns on bonds and stocks, and weight possible losses 2.5 times more heavily than possible gains 
of the same magnitude. However, recent experimental studies reveal a strong rejection of the S-Shape value 
function suggested by PT (see Levy & Levy 2002a, 2002b). 
6 See also Handa [1977]. 
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II. Contrasting PT (and CPT) with the CAPM 
 We analyze in this section the effect of each of the main components of PT and CPT 
discussed above on the CAPM, and then analyze the combined effect of all three components of 
CPT on the equilibrium risk-return relationship. Let us first demonstrate that, because the 
subjective decision weights, PT may violate the monotonicity axiom and contradicts the CAPM. 
This motivates the introduction of cumulative probalibity distortions, which characterize the CPT. 
  
(a) PT and First Order Stochastc Dominance (FSD) 
 In the CAPM framework, all investors are assumed to have homogeneous expectations. 
As a result, in this framework, all risk averse investors, regardless of preferences, will mix the 
market portfolio m with the riskless asset. This result is well known as the Separation Theorem 
(see Figure 1). If investors employ subjective decision weights ω(p) rather than the objective 
probabilities p, it is possible that interior portfolios such as m1 or m2 will be selected (see Figure 
1). Moreover, it will no longer be true that all investors select the same portfolio; hence the 
separation theorem and the CAPM no longer hold. To see this, let us refer, once again, to Figure 
1. Portfolio m is the market portfolio and under the CAPM all investors hold some combinations 
of m and r (the separation property of the CAPM). However, with decision weights it is possible 
that portfolio m1 or even portfolio m2 will provide a higher expected utility than portfolio m. For 
example, suppose that the decision weights of the kth investor, ωk(p), are defined so that portfolios 
m1 and m2 are subjectively shifted to the subjective points, say, m1(s) and m2(s) where the s-
subscript indicates that subjective probabilities are employed, and the mean and variance of 
portfolio m remain unchanged.7 Then, each investor will have his/her best subjective portfolio, 
mi(s) (where mi can be an interior portfolio before the probability distortion, see Figure 1), the 
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Separation Theorem will not hold and hence the classic Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin CAPM will 
collapse.8  
(Figure 1) 
 As mentioned in the introduction, using decision weights ωk(p) for investor k has several 
drawbacks: the sum of the subjective probabilities may be less or more than 1, first degree 
stochastic dominance (FSD) may be violated which is tantamount to a violation of the 
monotonicity axiom (see Fishburn [1982], Yaari [1987]), and decision weights cannot be 
employed in the continuous case. While the first and the third drawbacks are trivial, the second 
one can be illustrated with a simple example composed of two monetary values y1 < y2. With 
these two monetary values and with decision weights, it is possible that the mix U(ω(p)y1 + 
ω(1−p) y2) > U(y2) despite the fact that y2 > y1, and U is monotonic; hence employing decision 
weights may contradict the monotonicity axiom and FSD. For example, choose p = ½ and ω(½), =  
¾, y1 = $50 and y2 = $100. Then, the investor may prefer the bet [($50, ½), ($100, ½)] 
(subjectively perceived as [($50, ¾), ($100, ¾)]) to $100 with certainty, which is an unacceptable 
result. Thus, though y2 dominates the distribution [(y1, p), (y2, 1−p)] by FSD, its subjective 
expected utility may be lower when decision weights are employed. In terms of Figure 1, this 
means that investors may prefer portfolio A to portfolio B despite the fact that portfolio B 
dominates portfolio A by FSD. Note that the FSD dominance of portfolio B over portfolio A (see 
Figure 1) stems from the normality assumption. To see the relationship between M-V and FSD, 
recall that the cumulative distribution of portfolio A is located to the left of the cumulative 
distribution of portfolio B, because the density distributions of the two portfolios are identical, 
except for the fact that B is shifted to the right (recall that A and B are both normally distributed 
and have the same variance). Thus, portfolio B dominates portfolio A by FSD.  If FSD is not kept, 
due to the probability weights transformation, investors may choose portfolio A; i.e., they will not 
                                                          
8 In PT it remains unspecified whether the investors first mix the portfolio of risky assets with the riskless 
asset and only then distort the probabilities, or distort the probabilities of risky assets portfolio first and then 
mix the subjective portfolio with the riskless asset. In both cases, an interior portfolio may be selected as 
discussed in the text.  
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hold a portfolio located on the objective efficient frontier. This, of course, violates the CAPM (see 
Sharpe [1964] and Roll [1977]) derived from EUT and normally distributed returns.9&10 
 Noting that PT with decision weights may contradict the monotonicity axiom, it was 
suggested that the subjective probability distortion should be expressed as a transformation of the 
cumulative probability function F rather than a transformation of the raw probability p; hence the 
name Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) suggested by T&K in 1992. To be more specific, 
according to CPT, investors make decisions based on Tk(F) rather than on F, where F is the 
objective cumulative distribution, and T is some (non-decreasing) monotonic transformation with 
the property Tk(1) =1 and Tk(0)=0. This type of transformation overcomes the deficiencies of the 
decision weights: the total probability is always 1 by construction, the transformed distribution is 
still a probability distribution function and there is no contradiction to FSD (monotonicity axiom), 
because if F(x) ≤ G(x) for all values x, and Tk is a monotonic transformation (i.e., )(⋅′kT ≥ 0), then 
Tk(F(x)) ≤ Tk(G(x)) for all x and all Tk (see Lemma below). Thus, if one prospect dominates the 
other by FSD with objective probabilities, all investors will accept this dominance even if they 
subjectively distort the cumulative probability function. Finally, the transformation of the 
cumulative distribution can be employed with discrete and continuous random variables alike. 11 
 The rest of the paper focuses on cumulative probability distribution distortion as 
suggested by CPT. Because the other components (change in wealth and value function) are 
common to both PT and CPT, we refer in the rest of the paper only to CPT. Let us turn now to the 
factor which constitutes the main conflicting factor between CPT and EUT: by CPT, investors 
                                                          
9 If the CAPM is not based on EUT then FSD need not hold. See Hens and Pilgrim [2003,chapter 7] for 
necessary conditions to guarantee FSD in this general case. 
10 The fact that the selected portfolio is not on the M-V frontier indicates that the CAPM does not hold 
(Sharpe [1964] and Roll [1977]). However, one may be tempted to believe that in such a case the segmented 
market equilibrium (the GCAPM) holds (See Levy [1978], Merton [1987], Markowitz [1990] and Sharpe 
[1991]). But this is an incorrect conclusion because the selected portfolio by the kth investor may be 
dominated by FSD by another portfolio also in the GCAPM framework; hence such a selection with 
decision weights contradicts NM expected utility theory. In other words, the investor may select a portfolio 
located inside the CAPM or GCAPM efficient frontiers. Employing a direct utility maximization rather than 
selecting a portfolio by the mean-variance rule (see Levy & Markowitz [1979], and Markowitz [1991], is 
affected by decision weights in a similar way: an interior portfolio may be selected.  
11 For the effect of various transformations on the efficient set, derived under various assumptions regarding 
preference, see Levy and Weiner [1998]. 
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make decisions based on change of wealth while by EUT, decisions should be based on total 
wealth, i.e., the initial wealth plus the change of wealth. 
 
(b) Change of Wealth, x, Versus Total Wealth, w+x. 
 In this section, we focus only on one component of CPT, namely the claim that investors 
make decisions based on change of wealth, x, rather than on total wealth, w+x. We show that by 
ignoring the initial wealth prices are generally affected; yet the linear CAPM relationship (with 
different parameters) is intact.  
 It is easy to construct an example revealing that a maximization of expected utility of 
changes in wealth does not lead to the same choice as the maximization of the expected utility of 
total wealth.12 Hence, by itself this component of CPT is sufficient to induce a contradiction 
between EUT and CPT. However, despite the fact that decision by EU(x) and EU(w+x) may lead 
to different choices, we will show that the separation theorem is intact and, therefore, the CAPM 
holds even when decisions are based on change in wealth. This claim seems to be paradoxical at 
first glance, but it is not. To see this, recall that by the separation theorem, all portfolios which are 
located on the capital market line (CML), constitute the M-V efficient set. Each investor selects 
his/her optimum portfolio from the efficient set. The various choices from the efficient set do not 
affect the separation theorem and the CAPM. The only crucial factor for the CAPM derivation is 
that all investors choose from the M-V efficient set and, by making the investment based on 
change of wealth rather than total wealth, the efficient set does not change. To show this  point, 
simply note that the following trivial conditions hold: 
 E(w+x) ≥ E(w+y)     ⇔    E(x) ≥ E(y) 
 σ2 (w+x)  ≤ σ2(w+y) ⇔    σ2(x) ≤ σ2(y)    
 
where w, the initial wealth is a constant. 
 Similarly the FSD efficient set is independent of the initial wealth because 
                                                          
12 Take x= $10 or x = $1,000 with an equal probability and y = $300 with certainty. Assume an initial 
wealth of $9,000. For a square root utility function we have 
  EU(x) ≅ 15.81 < EU(y) ≅ 17.32 
and  EU(w+x) ≅ 97.43 > EU(w+y) ≅ 96.44 
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 F(w+x) ≤ G(w+x)  ⇔ F(x)  ≤ G(x). 
Graphically, by adding w, the two distributions under consideration are simply shifted to the right 
by a constant.13 
 Figure 2 illustrates the effect of the initial wealth, w, on the M-V efficient set, on the 
separation theorem and on the optimal portfolio of assets. Line rr' contains the portfolio 
compositions (for $1 investment, or when the expected values and standard deviations are 
measured in percent) of all the efficient M-V portfolios. By the argument above it is clear that rr’ 
is unaffected by whether w is included or omitted from the decision. Therefore, without loss of 
generality, in deriving the efficient set, we can assume that all investors invest $1, and x measures 
the rate of return on this one dollar, i.e. the change in wealth per one dollar of investment.14 
 It is important to emphasize that making portfolio investment decisions based on EU(x) 
rather than EU(w+x) does affect equilibrium prices of risky assets. Take the extreme case where 
all investors have preferences U(w+x) and U(x) as illustrated in Figure 2. For given fundamentals, 
i.e. future distributions 1iV
~
(where 1iV
~
 stands for the future value of the ith firm), with U(x) rather 
than U(w+x) the demand for risky assets will be lower and the equilibrium prices 0iV  may be 
lower. Therefore, the mean rate of return on the ith asset iµ  may be higher.  Thus, we may have a 
different Security Market Line (SML) with U(x) and U(w+x), but still we get the same general 
β−µ linear relationship as advocated by the CAPM. In other words, the parameters of the SML 
change but the linearity is intact. Thus, in the EUT framework one cannot ignore initial wealth, w.  
As we are concerned with the CAPM (and not EUT), in the rest of the paper we can safely ignore 
the initial wealth, w, i.e., switch from w+x to x. 
 
                                                          
13 This assertion is intact also for second and third degree stochastic dominance (SSD and TSD, 
respectively) as well as for prospect stochastic dominance (PSD). In the last case, the proof is less trivial but 
as we do not explicitly need it for this paper, we do not give the proof here. We refer the interested reader to 
Levy and Wiener [1998], and Levy [1998]. 
14 Note that if we measure the portfolio expected return and the standard deviation in dollars rather than in 
percents (as required by EUT), the line rr' will change as a function of the initial wealth w. However, the 
portfolio compositions described by line rr' are unaffected by the initial wealth, which allows all standard 
mean-variance analysis to be conducted in percent rather than the dollar terms. 
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(c ) Transformation of the cumulative probability distribution 
 In analyzing the effect of the transformation T(⋅) on the equilibrium risk-return 
relationship, we assume, as in the CAPM, that investors face the riskless asset, the distributions of 
all individual assets, and the distributions of all unlevered as well as levered available portfolios 
and the distribution of mutual funds, and, in particular, index funds, which mimic the market 
portfolio.15  Considering all these investment possibilities, the investors first distort all these 
available probability distributions, as suggested by CPT, and then make a choice from the 
distorted distributions. However, portfolios that include risky and the riskless asset, i.e., portfolios 
located on the Capital Market Line (CML) are distorted. 
 Figure 3 demonstrates the mean-variance efficient frontier before the probability 
distortion), the capital market line rr', and the curve of all efficient distributions after the 
probability distortion, denoted by rr'1. The CAPM efficient frontier (before the returns are 
distorted) is given by curve AmA1 with portfolio m as the tangential portfolio. T1 is a hypothetical 
subjective efficient frontier where a transformation T1 (⋅) was conducted, corresponding to 
investor k = 1. The same results obviously hold for all transformations Tk(⋅) as long as T'k(⋅) > 0. 
We have no knowledge regarding the shape of the distorted distributions frontier in the mean-
variance space: this subjective frontier can be above, below or even intersect line rr' depending on 
the particular transformation T1(⋅). Also, the shape of T1 depends on the specific selected 
transformation. Moreover, note that distorted distributions are not normal anymore; hence, one 
cannot employ the mean-variance rule to select the tangential portfolio. Although each investor 
has his/her subjective efficient frontier, a priori, the curve rr'1 may include inefficient portfolios 
with objective probabilities like portfolios A', d, etc. (see Figure 3). We will show below that this 
is not the case and that rr'1 (the subjective efficient frontier) is composed solely of combinations of 
portfolio m and the riskless asset. Without a probability distortion, for any asset below line rr' 
there is a portfolio (mutual fund) on line rr' which dominates it by FSD (see Figure 3). After the 
                                                          
15 However, the existence of the riskless asset is not crucial because if it does not exist the zero-beta 
equilibrium of Black [1972] rather than Sharpe-Lintner CAPM is intact. Investors do not have to directly 
construct their portfolios from the thousands of stocks available but rather look at the distribution of returns 
of mutual funds (and, in particular, index funds) and then distort these distributions. 
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distortion, portfolio a is shifted to a', b to b', c to c', etc. Note, that a' does not have to be vertically 
above a because the parameters are distorted (the same holds for c and c', b and b' and d and d').  
We should ask the question, whether there are portfolios which are located below rr’ on the rr’1 
efficient frontier and whether for each portfolio d on line rr’, there is a portfolio d’’ on the rr’1 
efficient frontier, which is composed solely of m and r and dominates the portfolio d’ by FSD. We 
prove in the Theorem below that these two questions can be positively answered. Thus it follows 
that only portfolios located on rr1 are contained in the rr’1 efficient portfolio. Therefore, the SMLT 
is intact!16 This is a very strong result, because the distorted distributions, Tk(⋅), are not normal 
even though the objective distributions (before the transformations have been conducted) are 
assumed to be normal. Moreover, each investor has his/her subjective transformation Tk(⋅); hence 
investors face different subjective efficient frontiers. We point out the following Lemma: 
 Lemma: Let F and G be the cumulative distributions of two distinct prospects. Denote by 
U1, the set of all non-decreasing utility functions, and by V the set of all S-shaped utility (value) 
functions suggested by PT and CPT. Then: 
a) FSD: F(x) ≤ G(x) for all x ⇔ EF U(x) ≥ EGU(x) for all U∈U1. 
b) PSD (Prospect Stochastic Dominance): 
[ ] 0)()( ≥−∫xy dttFtG  for all y<0 and x>0 ⇔ EF V(x) ≥ EGV(x) for all V∈V. 
c) F(x) ≤ G(x) for all x ⇔ Tk(F(x))  ≤  Tk (G(x)) for all x and all transformations, Tk(⋅), 
 as long as T'k 0)( ≥⋅ .   
   d) Suppose that x and y are normally distributed with means and variances 
( ),(and), 2yy
2
xx σµσµ ,  respectively.  If µx > µy and σx = σy  then x dominates y by 
                                                          
16 Similarly, the GCAPM (see Levy [1978], Merton [1987], Markowitz [1990] and Sharpe [1991]) follows 
in cases where portfolios composed of a relatively small number of assets are held and the transformations 
T(⋅) are conducted on these portfolios.  
17 The same claim holds also if F and G are lognormally distributed. The reason is that GF σ=σ  and 
GF EE >  are also necessary and sufficient conditions for FSD dominance of F over G for lognormal 
distributions. (see Levy [1973] [1991]). Therefore, also in the lognormal case, dominance by M-V rule 
implies dominance by FSD, which is intact also after the probability distortion takes place. The advantage 
of the lognormality assumption is that the returns are bounded from below; i.e., R > 0. The disadvantage of 
the lognormality assumption is that a distribution of a mix of two lognormal random variables is distributed 
only approximately but not precisely as lognormal distribution (see Lintner [1972]). 
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FSD. Namely, EU(x) ≥ EU(y) for all utility functions with U′ ≥ 0. It follows from b) above 
that in this case x dominates y also by PSD, because obviously FSD ⇒ PSD. 
 For the proof of (a), see Hanoch and Levy [1969], Hadar and Russell [1969], and Levy 
(1992). For the proof of (b) and (c) see Levy and Weiner [1998] and Levy [1998]. For 
proof of (d) see Hanoch and Levy [1969].  
   
 Using the Lemma we are able to prove our main result, that asserts that the separation 
theorem and the SMLT hold, even with the transformation Tk(⋅) which varies across investors and 
where Tk(F(x)) and Tk(G(x)) are obviously not normal distributions anymore. 
 Theorem:  Suppose that before the transformations Tk(⋅) are conducted, the rates of 
return are normally distributed. When the riskless asset exists, then for any mix of a 
portfolio of risky assets with the riskless asset, there is a mix of the market portfolio m 
(see Figure 1), with the riskless asset which dominates it by FSD. This statement is valid 
also after the transformation Tk(⋅) is conducted and the normality is violated, as long as 
T′k (⋅) > 0. Hence, all investors maximizing a subjective expected utility, as for example in 
CPT, hold the mix of portfolio m and the riskless asset, implying that the separation 
theorem and the SMLT are intact.17 
 Proof: Investors can mix any portfolio, efficient or inefficient, mutual funds and 
individual assets with the riskless asset.  Suppose that after the probability distortion an investor 
selects to mix portfolio m2 with the riskless asset, e.g., selecting point A (see Figure 1). This could 
not be an optimal investment policy. In fact, recall first that before the distortion takes place, there 
is a portfolio B composed of m and r, which dominates portfolio A by the M-V rule. However, 
because A and B are normally distributed and by construction both have the same variance and B 
has a higher mean, we can use the Lemma d), to conclude that portfolio B dominates portfolio A 
by FSD. (The same argument holds for lognormal distribution, see footnote 17).  In the CPT 
framework, an investor makes investment decisions based on )x(F*A  ≡ Tk (FA(x)) and )x(F*B ≡ 
Tk(FB(x)) rather than on FA(x) and FB(x).   
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Because these transformed distributions, )x(F*A  and )x(F
*
B  may not be normal anymore, one 
cannot employ the M-V rule for investment decision-making. However, by the Lemma c), FB(x) < 
FA(x) ⇔ Tk (FB(x)) < Tk(FA(x)); hence we conclude that portfolio B dominates portfolio A by 
FSD also after the probability distortion, for any transformation Tk such that kT′ (⋅) > 0. 
 The same procedure can be employed to prove that any portfolio below line rr' is 
dominated by some portfolio located on line rr' with and without the probability distortion. 
Moreover, the dominance is by FSD, hence all expected utility maximizers will choose to mix 
portfolio m with r (see Figure 3).        
 Yet, by the Theorem all investors will diversify between m and r, because for any other 
combination (say of m2 and r, see Figure 1) there is at least one combination of m and r which 
dominates it by FSD, before as well as after the transformation Tk(⋅) is employed. Because FSD 
corresponds to all U∈U1, it allows us to obtain the separation theorem for all investors regardless 
of their preference, despite the fact that the normality (or lognormality, see footnote 17) is violated 
as a result of the transformation Tk(⋅). Therefore, the SMLT with homogeneous expectation is 
intact despite the fact that normality is violated and the transformation Tk(⋅) varies across investors 
Namely, the homogeneous expectation Sharpe and Lintner’s SMLT is valid even with 
heterogeneous expectations.18 Finally, note that investors do not have to directly mix portfolios of 
                                                          
18 The Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin CAPM holds also under quadratic utility function, or for concave utility 
functions with a quadratic approximation (see Levy & Markowitz [1979]). However, probability distortion 
with quadratic preferences affects the CAPM. As the normality assumption is relaxed, portfolio B 
dominates portfolio A by the M-V rule but not necessarily by FSD (see Figure 1). Therefore, Portfolio A 
may dominate Portfolio B by the M-V rule after the transformation is done, hence the Separation Theorem 
does not hold and the CAPM collapses. However, it can be shown that in such a case the following 
modified CAPM is intact 
  ∑
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where Wk is the wealth of the kth investor, kµ is the mean return of the portfolio selected by the kth 
investor, ikβ  is the beta of the ith asset calculated with the portfolio selected by the kth investor and ikµ  is 
the mean of  the ith asset after the distortion of probability takes place, hence the index k. Thus, apart from 
Wk and r all figures are affected by the probability distortion. This equation is similar to Levy’s GCAPM 
equilibrium [1978]. Note that the equilibrium mean is affected by the probability distortion as well as by the 
wealth of each investor. Also note that if probabilities are not distorted  iikmk , β=βµ=µ  and this 
equation is reduced to the security market line of the CAPM. 
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risky assets with the riskless asset because a mutual fund (index funds) with assets represented by 
point B may be purchased.19 
 In the derivation of the SMLT, risk-aversion is assumed to avoid infinite borrowing. The 
S-shape PT value function has a risk-seeking segment in the negative domain. In the next section, 
we show that the S-shape value function is consistent with the SMLT, despite its risk-seeking 
segment. 
 
(d) The S-shaped Value Function, V(x) 
 In this section we assume no distortion in probabilities and focus on the S-shaped value 
function advocated by CPT. We analyze the role that the risk aversion plays in the CAPM 
derivation and show that the SMLT is also intact when S-shaped value functions are assumed. To 
show this claim, first note that FSD can be stated in terms of w+x or x and that also in the SMLT 
derivation the initial wealth can be ignored. To prove that the SMLT holds also for all S-shaped 
V(x) value functions we use Figure 4 and the previous results. We have shown before that because 
of the normality assumption, for any portfolio like portfolio Q, there is a portfolio Q' (see Figure 
4) which dominates it by FSD. However, as the set of all S-shaped functions is a subset of all non-
decreasing utility functions, it is obvious that FSD ⇒ PSD (but not vice-versa). Therefore, 
portfolio Q' dominates portfolio Q also by PSD, i.e., for all S-shaped value functions. Thus, the 
separation theorem and the CAPM holds also with all V(x) functions.  
(Figure 4) 
 Because we employ in the above proof FSD, i.e., a decision rule corresponding to 
preferences U∈U1, one may be tempted to believe that in the derivation of the asset equilibrium 
prices (CAPM) the risk-seeking preference in the whole range is also allowed. While this is true 
                                                          
19 Another possibility is that investors first distort all possible risky portfolios and then mix the distorted 
portfolio with the riskless asset. The SMLT is intact also in this case. Moreover, suppose even that the 
riskless asset does not exist.  In such a case, all investors will choose a risky portfolio from segment MM' 
(see Figure 1), because for any other portfolio located below MM' there is a portfolio located on this 
segment with the same variance and a higher mean. This guarantees not only M-V dominance but also FSD 
dominance (recall the normality assumption). Thus, each investor selects a portfolio from the efficient  
frontier MM' (though not all will select the same portfolio), a case when the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM does not 
hold but the zero-beta equilibrium model of Black (1972) is intact. 
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for achieving the separation property, it is not true for the CAPM to have equilibrium. To see this, 
consider a risk seeking investor, e.g., U(x) = ex , hence U∈U1. This investor still prefers portfolio 
Q' to Q. However, as he/she is a risk-seeker, increasing leverage (moving along rr'  in the direction 
of the arrows (in Figure 4) increases expected utility (U3 > U2 > U1), because both expected return 
and variance increases simultaneously, and both are desired by a risk-seeker investor (recall that 
normality is assumed). Thus, if unlimited borrowing is allowed (which is not the case in practice), 
it is sufficient that there will be one risk-seeking investor whose demand for portfolio m will be 
infinite (financed with an infinite borrowing) in order to induce infinite prices, which contradicts 
equilibrium. Of course, the infinite demand for portfolio m does not occur with risk aversion in 
the whole range, see indifference curves V1, V2, and V3 in Figure 4.20 
 As the S-shaped value function has concave as well as convex sections, it is ambiguous 
whether an interior solution like the one demonstrated by the U1, U2, U3 (see Figure 4) will take 
place. A necessary condition (but not sufficient) for a finite optimum borrowing is that to the right 
of a given point the value function (or utility) function must be concave. The K&T [1979] value 
function fulfills this necessary condition. Not all possible value functions will yield a finite 
optimum borrowing. The optimum borrowing (finite or infinite) depends on the speed of the 
reduction in V' as we shift to the right and to the left of x = 0. Thus, one may need to impose 
constraints on the S-shaped functions because not all guarantee a finite borrowing.  
 
(e)   CPT and the CAPM: the simultaneous effect of  change of  wealth, transformation of the 
probability distribution, and S-shaped value function on the CAPM. 
 So far, we have analyzed the effect of each of the three components of PT and CPT on the 
CAPM. Now we will analyze their simultaneous effect on the separation theorem and on the 
CAPM. We compare the following two alternative paradigms: 
 I. EUT:  Suppose initially that the conditions of the CAPM holds: distributions F(w+x), 
G(w+x), etc. are normal and investors maximize EU(w+x) where U is concave (U' > 0, U'' < 0) 
and w+x is the total wealth. Under these conditions the separation theorem and the Sharpe-Lintner 
SMLT follow. 
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 II. CPT:  Suppose now that F(w+x) and G(w+x) are normally distributed, the kth investor 
looks at F(x) and G(x), where x is the change in wealth, makes subjective transformations 
)(),( ** GTGFTF kkkk == , etc., and then chooses the portfolios which maximize EV(x) where 
V(x) is an S-shaped value function with a risk-seeking segment. 
 Frameworks (I) and (II) are quite different, and do not lead to the same optimal levered 
portfolio choice, hence may lead to different equilibrium prices. Yet both lead to the separation 
theorem and the SMLT. We demonstrate the simultaneous effect of the three factors of CPT, once 
again, by means of Figure 4. 
 Because of the normality assumption, Portfolio Q' with corresponding cumulative 
distribution F(w+x) dominates Q with corresponding cumulative distribution G(w+x) by FSD (see 
Figure 4). Because the FSD relationship is unaffected by the initial wealth, we also conclude that 
distribution F(x) dominates G(x) by FSD even if stated in terms of change of wealth rather than 
terminal wealth. Because FD1G implies Tk(F)D1Tk(G) (where D1 means dominance by FSD), 
portfolio Q' dominates portfolio Q even with a subjective monotone transformation Tk as long as  
0T'k > ,  despite the fact that the distributions Tk(F) and Tk(G) are not normal anymore. Also, Tk 
varies across investors; hence the homogeneous expectation assumption is violated. Finally, 
because FSD ⇒ PSD, where PSD corresponds to all S-shaped value functions V(x), we conclude 
that portfolio Q' dominates portfolio Q for all value functions V(x). Thus, with non-normality of 
Tk(F) and Tk(G), and no-risk aversion prevalence everywhere (as characterizes the value 
functions, V(x)), for every portfolio located below the CML (such as portfolio Q), there is a 
portfolio located on the CML (such as portfolio Q') which dominates it for all CPT investors. 
Therefore, even in CPT framework all investors will choose to mix portfolio m with the riskless 
asset, and the separation theorem and the SMLT is valid in the CPT framework.  
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III. Concluding Remarks 
 Mean-variance analysis, the CAPM and Prospect Theory (and Cumulative Prospect 
Theory) were the innovations of Markowitz, Sharpe, Lintner, Mossin and Kahneman and Tversky, 
for which Markowitz, Sharpe and Kahneman won the Nobel prize in economics. The CAPM and 
PT seem to contradict each other. Surprisingly, we show in this paper that the SMLT is intact in 
the PT framework.  
 Since 1979 there has been a direct and strong attack on NM expected utility  led by 
Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory (PT). Experimental findings reveal that investors make 
decisions based on change of wealth, x, rather than total wealth w+x, subjectively distort 
probabilities, and maximize the expected value of an S-shaped value function V(x). 
 The fact that investors base decisions on x rather than on w+x is sufficient to contradict 
NM expected utility paradigm, because the optimum portfolio choice generally depends on the 
initial wealth, w. We use in this paper the First Degree Stochastic Dominance (FSD) and recently 
developed Prospect Stochastic Dominance (PSD) criteria to show that the Separation Theorem 
and the CAPM are intact in the CPT framework despite the violation of normality, the violation of 
risk-aversion as implied by the S-shape value function, and the violation of NM expected utility as 
implied by basing decisions on change of wealth rather than on total wealth. While it is true that 
under CPT the optimum selected levered portfolio of the kth individual is not the same as under the 
CAPM, all investors will still choose a portfolio located on the Sharpe-Lintner CML and the 
CAPM separation theorem is intact in the CPT framework.  All investors will hold a mix of the 
market portfolio (portfolio m) and the riskless asset, hence the CAPM risk-return linear 
relationship holds when the objective parameters (i.e., before the distributions are distorted) are 
employed. It is important to emphasize that equilibrium prices in the CPT framework are not 
identical to the CAPM equilibrium prices. Similarly the β−µ security line may have different 
parameters under these two frameworks. Yet, the general form of the SMLT (the security market 
line theorem) still holds under CPT and beta is the risk index, though the SML may have a 
different slope under CPT than under the CAPM. To sum up, the CPT challenges the NM 
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expected utility paradigm but the valuation formula of the CAPM and CPT coexist − quite a 
surprising result! 
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